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Abstract. Implementation flaws in cryptographic libraries, design flaws
in algorithms underlying cryptographic primitives, and weaknesses in
protocols using both, can all lead to exploitable vulnerabilities in soft-
ware. Manually fixing such issues is challenging and resource consum-
ing, especially when maintaining legacy software that contains broken
or outdated cryptography, and for which source code may not be avail-
able. While there is existing work on identifying cryptographic primitives
(often in the context of malware analysis), none of this prior work has
focused on replacing such primitives with stronger (or more secure ones)
after they have been identified. This paper explores feasibility of design-
ing and implementing a toolchain for Augmentation and Legacy-software
Instrumentation of Cryptographic Executables (ALICE). The key features
of ALICE are: (i) automatically detecting and extracting implementa-
tions of weak or broken cryptographic primitives from binaries without
requiring source code or debugging symbols, (ii) identifying the context
and scope in which such primitives are used, and performing program
analysis to determine the effects of replacing such implementations with
more secure ones, and (iii) replacing implementations of weak primi-
tives with those of stronger or more secure ones. We demonstrate prac-
tical feasibility of our approach on cryptographic hash functions with
several popular cryptographic libraries and real-world programs of vari-
ous levels of complexity. Our experimental results show that ALICE can
locate and replace insecure hash functions, even in large binaries (we
tested ones of size up to 1.5MB), while preserving existing functional-
ity of the original binaries, and while incurring minimal execution-time
overhead in the rewritten binaries. We also open source ALICE’s code at
https://github.com/SRI-CSL/ALICE.
Keywords: Binary analysis · Cryptographic executables · Software in-
strumentation.
? Work done partially while at SRI International.
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1 Introduction
Cryptography is instrumental to implementing security services such as confi-
dentiality, integrity, and authenticity in most software (both, new and legacy). In
practice, proper usage and correct implementation of cryptographic primitives
are difficult; vulnerabilities often occur due to misuse or erroneous implementa-
tions of cryptographic primitives. Example vulnerabilities arising from misuse of
cryptography include weak and/or broken random number generators, resulting
in enabling an adversary to recover servers’ private keys [1]. Cryptographic APIs
are sometimes misused by software developers, e.g., causing applications to be
insecure against specific attacks, such as chosen plaintext [2] which a typical
software developer may be unaware of.
In addition, incorrect implementations of cryptographic primitives can result
in leakage of secrets through side-channels [3] or through “dead memory” [4].
Other vulnerabilities in software for embedded and generic systems include im-
plementation flaws in cryptographic libraries (e.g., the HeartBleed [5] and Poo-
dle [6] vulnerabilities in the OpenSSL library), weaknesses in protocol suites
(e.g., cryptographic weakness in HTTPS implementations [7, 8]), and algorith-
mic vulnerabilities in cryptographic primitives (e.g., an unknown collision attack
on the MD5 hash function [9] or a chosen-prefix collision attack on the SHA1
hash function [10]). Even after such vulnerabilities are discovered, it may take a
while before appropriate fixes are applied to existing software as demonstrated
by a recent large-scale empirical study [11] that showed many software projects
did not patch cryptography-related vulnerabilities for a full year after their pub-
lic disclosure. This represents a large window for adversaries to exploit such
vulnerabilities.
We argue that (automated) tools that assist software and system designers,
and developers, in performing identification, analysis, and replacement in bina-
ries (without requiring source code) can help shorten such vulnerability window,
especially for legacy software. To address this issue, we explore feasibility of
designing and developing a toolchain for Augmentation and Legacy-software In-
strumentation of Cryptographic Executables (ALICE).
Contributions: Specifically, our goal is to make the following contributions:
1. We design the ALICE framework to automatically augment and instrument
executables with broken or insecure cryptographic primitives. We also open
source ALICE’s code at https://github.com/SRI-CSL/ALICE.
2. We develop heuristics to identify (binary) code segments implementing cryp-
tographic primitives (see Table 4 in Appendix A for a list of such primitives).
3. We develop heuristics to determine the scope of the (binary) code segments
requiring augmentation if the cryptographic primitives are replaced with
stronger ones.
4. We implement ALICE and experimentally evaluate its performance on several
executable open source binaries of varying complexity.
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Outline: The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses
related work. Section 3 overviews the ALICE toolchain, while Section 4 contains
its design details. Due to space constraints, implementation details are described
in Appendix B. Section 5 contains the results of our experimental evaluations.
Section 6 discusses ALICE’s limitations, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Identifying Cryptographic Primitives. Several publicly available tools [12–
14] utilize static analysis to identify cryptographic primitives by detecting known
(large) constants used in their operation. Such constants, for example, can be
in the form of look-up tables (e.g., S-Boxs in AES) or a fixed initialization
vectors/values (e.g., IV in SHA-128/256). Such tools do not always produce
accurate results as the detected algorithm may be another function or another
cryptographic primitive that uses the same constant values [15]. They are also
ineffective when dealing with obfuscated programs [16].
In terms of academic efforts, Lutz [17] detects block ciphers from execution
traces based on three heuristics: the presence of loops, high entropy, and inte-
ger arithmetic. Grobert et al. [18] introduce an additional heuristic to extract
cryptographic parameters from such execution traces and identify primitives by
comparing the input-output relationships with those of known cryptographic
functions. Lestringant et al. [15] propose a static method based on data flow
graph isomorphism to identify symmetric cryptographic primitives. Recently,
the CryptoHunt [19] tool develop a new technique called bit-precise symbolic
loop mapping to identify cryptographic primitives in obfuscated binaries.
Our work focuses on non-obfuscated programs as we target common (and
possibly legacy) software and not malware. We rely on finding known constants
to identify cryptographic primitives as our first step. We then improve the ac-
curacy of detection by applying a heuristic based on input-output relationships,
similar to the work in [18]. In contrast to [18], our identification algorithm does
not require program execution traces.
While there is existing work on identifying executable segments implementing
cryptographic primitives, none of such work investigates the problem of replacing
an identified weak primitive with a more secure one. Such replacement requires
non-trivial operations, even if one can successfully identify executable segments
implementing cryptographic primitives. To accomplish such replacement, one
has to perform the following: (1) determining all changes throughout the binary
necessary for replacing the identified primitive, and (2) rewriting the binary
to apply all of the determined changes. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no prior work addressing the first task, as a standalone, or in conjunction
with the second. The second task can be tackled using slight modifications of
existing binary rewriting techniques. In this paper, we categorize different types
of necessary changes one may require when replacing a cryptographic primitive,
and then discuss how to locate and rewrite each category of such changes in
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Section 4.2. In the rest of this section, we overview general binary rewriting
techniques.
Rewriting Binaries. Binary rewriting is a technique that transforms a binary
executable into another without requiring the original’s source code. Typically,
the transformed binary must preserve the functionality of the original one while
possibly augmenting it with extra functionalities. There are two main categories
of binary rewriting: static and dynamic binary rewriting.
In static binary rewriting [20–23], the original binary is modified offline with-
out executing it. Static binary rewriting is typically performed by replacing the
original instructions with an unconditional jump that redirects the program con-
trol flow to the rewritten instructions, stored in a different area of the binary.
This relocation can be done at different levels of granularity such as inserting
a jump for each modified instruction, for the entire section or for each routine
containing modified instructions. Static binary rewriting often requires disas-
sembling the entire binary and thus incurs high overhead during the rewriting
phase, but typically results in small runtime overhead in the rewritten binary.
This technique is thus well-suited for scenarios where the runtime performance of
the rewritten binary is a primary concern. Another approach for static rewriting
is to transform the binary into the relocatable disassembled code and directly
rewrite instructions in the transformed code. Doing so completely eliminates
runtime and size overhead in the rewritten binary. Nonetheless, this approach
relies on many heuristics and assumptions for identifying and recovering all re-
locating symbols and is still subject to the high overhead during the rewriting
phase. Some example tools that are based on this approach are Uroboros [24]
and Ramblr [25].
Dynamic binary rewriting (or dynamic instrumentation) [26–29] modifies the
binary’s behaviors during its execution through the injection of instrumentation
code. Due to the need to instrument the code at runtime, this technique may
result in higher execution time compared to the original binary. The main advan-
tage of dynamic rewriting is its ability to accurately capture information about a
program’s states or behaviors, which is much harder when using static rewriting.
Example dynamic binary rewriting tools include Pin [27] and DynamoRIO [28].
In this work, we first leverage the runtime information retrieved from dynamic
instrumentation to accurately locate instructions that need to be rewritten. In-
struction rewriting is then performed statically in order to minimize the runtime
overhead of the rewritten binary.
3 Overview of the ALICE Framework
The most straightforward, and obvious, approach to replace implementations of
vulnerable cryptographic primitives requires modifying (and then recompiling)
a program’s source code. This takes time and effort, and renders it difficult to fix
legacy software for which source code may not be available. Instead, we propose
ALICE – a toolchain that automatically augments and replaces weak, vulnerable,
and/or broken cryptographic primitives at the binary level.
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To better illustrate how ALICE works, we start by presenting a simple repre-
sentative example shown in Figure 1. This example program first computes an
MD5 digest over an input string. The digest is then converted into a human-
readable form, which is in turn displayed to the user.
MD5 has been shown to be vulnerable to collision and pre-image attacks [30,
31]. Suppose that a system or software developer would like to manually rewrite
parts of the binary in order to support a more secure hash algorithm – e.g.,
SHA-256. One way to accomplish this task is to perform the following steps:
Step-1: Identify the functions in the binary that implement MD5.
Step-2: Recover the type and order of parameters in the identified functions.
Step-3: Insert an implementation of a SHA-256 function with the same type
and order of parameters into the original binary.
Step-4: Redirect all calls to MD5 to the newly added SHA-256 function.
Step-5: Determine all changes throughout the binary affected by an increase in
the digest size (MD5’s digest size is 128 bits while that of SHA-256 is 256 bits).
Step-6: Rewrite the binary according to changes discovered in step-5.
1 void MD5( const unsigned char∗ input ,
s i z e t input len , unsigned char∗
output ) {
2 MD5 CTX ctx ;
3 MD5Init(&ctx ) ;
4 MD5Update(&ctx , input , input l en ) ;
5 MD5Final ( output , &ctx ) ;
6 }
7
8 in t main ( void ) {
9 // I n i t i a l i z e input and output bu f f e r s
10 char input [ ] = ”Hello , world ! ” ;
11 s i z e t input l en = s t r l e n ( input ) ;
12 unsigned char d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ;
13 char hexd iges t [ 3 3 ] = {0} ;
14
15 // Compute : output = MD5( input )
16 MD5( input , input len , d i g e s t ) ;
17
18 // Convert output d i g e s t to hex s t r i n g
19 f o r ( i n t i =0; i < 16 ; i++) {
20 s p r i n t f ( hexd iges t+2∗ i , ”%02x” ,
d i g e s t [ i ] ) ;
21 }
22
23 // Print d i g e s t in hex format
24 f o r ( i n t i =0; i < 16 ; i++) {
25 p r i n t f ( ”%02x” , d i g e s t [ i ] ) ;
26 }
27
28 // Print hexd iges t s t r i n g
29 p r i n t f ( ”\n%s\n” , hexd iges t ) ;
30 return 0 ;
31 }
(a) Simple program utilizing a cryptographic
primitive (the MD5 hash function)
<main_fn_prologue >:
400629: push rbp
40062a: mov rbp ,rsp
40062d: sub rsp ,0x60
...
<call_to_md5 >:
400684: call 4004c0 <strlen@plt >
400689: mov rcx ,rax
40068c: lea rdx ,[rbp -0x40]
400690: lea rax ,[rbp -0x50]
400694: mov rsi ,rcx
400697: mov rdi ,rax
40069a: call 400616 <MD5 >
...
<sprintf_loop_body >:
4006ad: movzx eax ,BYTE PTR [rbp+rax*1-0x40]
4006b2: movzx eax ,al
4006b5: mov edx ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54]
4006b8: add edx ,edx
4006ba: movsxd rdx ,edx
4006bd: lea rcx ,[rbp -0x30]
4006c1: add rcx ,rdx
4006c4: mov edx ,eax
4006c6: mov esi ,0 x4007d4
4006cb: mov rdi ,rcx
4006ce: mov eax ,0x0
4006d3: call 400500 <sprintf@plt >
<sprintf_loop_condition >:
4006d8: add DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54],0x1
4006dc: cmp DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54],0xf
4006e0: jle 4006a8 <main+0x7f >
...
<printf_loop_body >:
4006eb: mov eax ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54]
4006ee: cdqe
4006f0: movzx eax ,BYTE PTR [rbp+rax*1-0x40]
4006f5: movzx eax ,al
4006f8: mov esi ,eax
4006fa: mov edi ,0 x4007d4
4006ff: mov eax ,0x0
400704: call 4004e0 <printf@plt >
<printf_loop_condition >:
400709: add DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54],0x1
40070d: cmp DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54],0xf
400711: jle 4006eb <main+0xc2 >
(b) Corresponding disassembly of main function
in (a), compiled with O0 flag
Fig. 1: An example of a simple program utilizing a cryptographic primitive (the
MD5 hash function in this case)
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Goal & Scope: ALICE is designed to automate the aforementioned steps. It tar-
gets ELF-based X86/64 binaries generated by compiling C programs. We do not
assume any knowledge of, or require, the corresponding source code or debug-
ging symbols. Since ALICE is built as a defensive tool to work on standard and
legacy software, it assumes the target programs are not malicious. Obfuscated or
malware binaries are out of scope in this work. We demonstrate concrete feasi-
bility on cryptographic hash functions, but the design and ideas behind ALICE
are general and can be applied to other primitives too.
NOTE: We use cryptographic hash functions (or hash functions) to denote the al-
gorithmic details behind the implementations/executables. We denote the func-
tions (or methods) in such implementations/executables that realize such hash
function(s) as hash routines. We use target hash functions/routines to refer to
the insecure hash functions/routines that need to be identified and replaced.
4 Design Details of ALICE
This section discusses the design details of the ALICE toolchain. The operation
of ALICE consists of three main phases: (i) identifying cryptographic primitives,
(ii) scoping changes, and (iii) augmenting and rewriting changes.
4.1 Identifying Cryptographic Primitives (Hash Functions)
We designed ALICE to target non-malicious (i.e., unobfuscated) binary programs.
The first phase of ALICE leverages this characteristic and identifies hash functions
by first detecting static features that are known of the target hash function.
Observation 1 (Constants) A common design approach for hash functions
is to initialize a digest buffer using well-known constants. As an example, MD5
uses 32-bit constant words: X1|X2|X3|X4 with the following hex values:
X1 = 0x67452301, X2 = 0xEFCDAB89, X3 = 0x98BADCFE, X4 = 0x10325476
If we locate such constants in a binary, there is a high chance that a routine
enclosing those constants implements part(s) of the MD5 hash function. Our
approach starts by scanning a binary program to find the addresses where known
constants appear. We then mark a routine in which those constants are enclosed
as a candidate implementation of the target hash function.
Observation 2 (Context Initialization) The example in Figure 1a illustrates
a typical usage of a hash function in practice. An application function – main()
– calls the MD5() function, which in turn calls MD5Init() to initialize a digest
buffer with known constants. Having a dedicated function to setup an initial
context (e.g., MD5Init()) is common practice when implementing most crypto-
graphic primitives and can be found in several open-source libraries such as the
OpenSSL or libgcrypt.
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This observation suggests that the identified candidate implementation will
typically correspond to the initialization routine – Init(). However, it is not
always the case as Init() could be inlined. For example, MD5Init() in Figure 1
will be inlined inside MD5() when the program is compiled with the optimiza-
tion flag O3. In this scenario, the identified routine will instead correspond to
the implementation of the target hash function – MD5(). One could use a simple
heuristic based on the size of the routine to distinguish between the two sce-
narios. However, we found this approach to produce a lot of false-negatives in
practice. Instead, we adopt a more conservative approach and consider routines
produced in both scenarios as candidates. More specifically, ALICE analyzes the
program’s callgraph and determines all routines that invoke the previously iden-
tified routine. It then includes those caller routines into the list of candidates.
Now, ALICE needs a mechanism to eliminate false-positives, which can arise
due to two reasons. The first reason is that our approach so far focuses on
ensuring no false-negatives by accepting all routines possibly implementing a
target hash routine. The second reason is that static features such as a constant
vector are not always unique to a single hash function. It is not uncommon for
different hash functions to share the same constant vectors. Examples of a pair
of hash functions that use the same constant vectors are BLAKE2b – SHA-512
and MD5 – MD4. In Figure 1, even if we successfully determine that MD5Init()
is inlined, we still cannot easily distinguish whether the identified hash routine
implements MD4 or MD5 hash function.
Observation 3 (Input/Output Uniqueness) A cryptographic hash function
is deterministic, i.e., for a given input string, it always generates the same di-
gest as output. The input/output pair is usually (in practice) unique to the hash
function that produces them.
With this observation, the best way to test whether a candidate implements
the target hash function is to execute the identified routine, and compare the
resulting output with the expected output. Since we expect the identification
phase to be an offline computation, naturally we would base this step of our
approach on an offline dynamic execution technique, which allows us to execute
a given routine with any concrete chosen input. This is in contrast with online
dynamic execution, which requires running the entire binary program with test
cases. To perform offline dynamic execution, it is necessary to setup a call stack
with proper parameters that will be passed into that routine.
Observation 4 (Parameters) An implementation of a cryptographic function
generally takes a fixed number of function parameters. For example, in Figure 1a,
MD5() include three parameters: an input string, the input length and an output
digest. Some implementations do not mandate the use of input length as it can
be inferred from the input string (e.g., via strlen()). Thus, a hash routine in
such implementations will take only two parameters. It is also worth noting that,
even though a number is fixed, the order in which these parameters appear may
not be the same for all implementations.
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Based on this observation, ALICE enumerates all possible combinations of a
hash routine’s parameters and prepares 8 ( = 3!+2!) call stacks, each initialized
with different combinations of parameters. It then executes a candidate routine
on each call stack and observes the output buffer after the execution. The first
phase of ALICE finishes by outputting candidates producing the expected output
as well as the parameter information obtained from corresponding call stacks.
4.2 Scoping Changes
After locating target hash routines, ALICE must determine changes (throughout
the binary) that are required for replacing such routines. We now describe three
categories of such changes using the illustrative example in Figure 1, and later
outline how to identify a subset of such changes (at the binary level).
C1 Routine Replacement: The first category is a change in the hash routine
itself. Code/instructions implementing the target hash routine are replaced
by code/instructions that implement a more secure hash function. For ex-
ample, if our goal is to replace the MD5 function with SHA-256 in Figure 1,
instructions corresponding to MD5() (i.e., the ones starting from address
0x400616) need to be replaced by SHA-256 instructions. We will discuss
how ALICE augments this type of change into a binary in Section 4.3.
C2 Changes in Buffers Sizes: Depending on the digest size of both the re-
placement and the target hash functions, other related memory buffers may
need to be enlarged to correctly accommodate the new replacement routine.
For instance, replacing MD5 with SHA-256 in Figure 1 would also require
enlarging the size of variables storing the output of the hash function (i.e.,
digest variable) from 16 bytes to 32 bytes. This change in buffer size af-
fects other memory buffers that consume the output digest, e.g., hexdigest
also needs to be expanded by 16 bytes. Such changes have to be scoped and
propagated throughout the entire binary. We discuss how to identify this
type of change in the remaining of this section and how ALICE performs
augmentation on such changes in Section 4.3.
C3 Changes in Logic: This category refers to changes that need to be applied
to the underlying binary logic in order to have a correct resulting binary
function. For example, in Figure 1, simply replacing MD5() with SHA-256()
and enlarging hexdigest and digest variable do not suffice to produce the
desired binary. One would have to also edit a loop terminating condition
from i < 16 to i < 32 in line 19 and 24 to reflect the replacement SHA-256.
At the binary-level, this change corresponds to modifying the instructions at
addresses 0x4006dc and 0x40070d from [cmp DWORD PTR [rbp-0x54],0xf]
to [cmp DWORD PTR [rbp-0x54],0x1f]. This requires knowing that the con-
stant 0xf in those instructions is related to the digest size. However, it is
hard, in some cases impossible, to locate and augment this type of changes
without any prior knowledge of the correct behavior of the resulting binary.
Therefore, we do not consider this category of changes in this work. We fur-
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ther discuss the difficulty of automatically determining this type of change
in Appendix D.
Of the three categories of changes, C1 is identified in the previous phase of
ALICE in Section 4.1 while C3 is out of scope in this work. The remainder of
this section will focus on how ALICE locates the changes from C2 .
ALICE leverages dynamic taint analysis to determine the change in buffer size
C2 . Typically, dynamic taint analysis starts by marking any data that comes
from an untrusted source as tainted. It then observes program execution to keep
track of the flow of tainted data in registers and memory. We adapt this idea to
identify all memory buffers that are affected (or tainted) by the output digest
of the target hash routine. In particular, our dynamic taint analysis executes a
binary on test inputs with the following taint policies:
Taint introduction. At the beginning of execution, ALICE initializes all mem-
ory locations to be non-tainted. During the execution, whenever entering the
target hash routine, ALICE reads the value in the parameter registers to observe
the base address of the output digest. Since the digest size is well-known and
deterministic for any given hash function, ALICE can also identify the entire ad-
dress range of the digest buffer. Upon exiting the routine, ALICE then assigns a
taint label to all memory locations in the digest buffer. ALICE uses three taint
labels to differentiate 3 types of memory allocations:
– Static allocation. In our target executables, static memory is allocated
at compile time before the program is executed. Thus, the location of this
type of memory is usually deterministic, stored in either .data or .bss
segment of the associated binary. Detecting whether a given memory location
is statically allocated is simply done by checking whether its address lies
within the boundaries of those segments.
– Heap-based allocation. ALICE traces all heap-based memory allocations
by intercepting a call to three well-known C routines: malloc(), calloc()
and realloc(). Whenever each of these routines is called, ALICE learns the
size of allocated memory by reading values of its parameter registers. Upon
exiting the same routine, ALICE then learns the base address of allocated
memory via the return value. With this information, ALICE later can deter-
mine whether memory at a given location is allocated on the heap.
– Stack-based allocation. ALICE maintains stack-related information of the
execution via a shadow stack. Specifically, after executing any call instruc-
tion, ALICE pushes into the shadow stack: a pair of the current stack pointer
and an address of the function being called. Upon returning from a routine
(via a ret instruction), ALICE pops the shadow stack. This information al-
lows ALICE to reconstruct stack frames at any point during the execution
of dynamic taint analysis. ALICE determines whether memory at a given
address is on the stack by checking it against all stack frames.
Taint Propagation. ALICE’s taint propagation rules are enforced at the word-
level granularity. While we could use a more precise granularity such as the
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bit-level [32], we did not find such approach to be cost-effective as test inputs
may require a timely interaction with a remote server; having a significantly long
delay in the dynamic taint analysis can cause the remote server to timeout and
consequently the analysis may not be performed as expected.
In addition to the general taint propagation rules, ALICE also considers the
taint-through-pointer scenario: if a register A is tainted and a register B is assigned
with the referenced value of A, i.e., B := *A, then B is considered tainted. Such
rule is necessary to accurately capture the data-flow in a common usage of a hash
function, where the raw digest value is converted to human-readable format via
a look-up table, e.g., the use of sprintf() in line 20 of Figure 1a.
Using these rules, ALICE’s dynamic taint analysis can determine, and assign
taint labels to, all memory locations affected by the output digest. At the end of
the analysis, ALICE aggregates individual tainted memory locations into unified
memory buffers. Our aggregation rule is simple: ALICE considers contiguous
memory locations to be a memory buffer if their address range is at least as long
as the target hash function’s digest size. Lastly, in this phase, ALICE outputs
the types (i.e., either stack-based, heap-based or static), locations (e.g., a stack
offset or global address), and relevant instructions (e.g., an instruction address
of a call to malloc) of memory buffers that are derived from the output digest.
4.3 Augmenting and Rewriting Changes
ALICE can incorporate several rewriting approaches. Since runtime of rewritten
binaries is our primary concern, we mainly use static binary rewriting that has
been previously shown to have minimal impact on the runtime [21].
To reduce the size of rewritten binaries, we rewrite at routine level rather
than at section level3. If there is at least one instruction that needs to be edited
in a particular routine, we rewrite the binary as follows:
1. Create a new empty section in the binary
2. Apply changes from C1 and C2 to the routine
3. Modify the routine with respect to the placement of the new section
4. Insert the entire rewritten routine into the new section
5. Insert a jump instruction to the new section at original routine’s entry point
Steps (1), (4) and (5) are explained in Section 2. We focus in this section on steps
(2) and (3). We refer to Appendix B for implementation details of all steps.
For step (3), we only need to ensure that the rewritten routine maintains the
correct control flow targets. Doing so requires editing all instruction operands in
the routine that use rip-relative addressing. The displacement of such operands
is recomputed based on the address of the new location:
new disp = old disp+ old inst addr − new inst addr
3 We intentionally avoid rewriting at the instruction level as this can potentially incur
significant run-time overhead for the rewritten/output binaries.
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In step (2), to apply changes from C1 , ALICE generates a patch from a user-
supplied C code that implements the replacement hash function, and adds them
to the new empty section of the binary. To ensure correctness of the rewritten bi-
naries, implementation of the user-supplied replacement hash function must have
the same parameter order as that of the target hash function as well as be self-
contained. These requirements are, however, simple to fulfill given that the user
already has access to the replacement hash function’s source-code; we discuss
this issue in detail in Appendix B. We also ensure that a call to the target hash
routine is redirected to this new code by simply rewriting the first instruction
of the target hash routine to: jmp [new code entry point]. For each memory
buffer identified in C2 , ALICE computes the new buffer size based on the ra-
tio of the digest sizes of the target hash function and that of the replacement
hash function, i.e., new size = dold size × |digestsecure|/|digesttarget|e. ALICE
rewrites the binary to support the expanded buffers by employing different tech-
niques for each type of buffers:
Static Buffer. As a static buffer is allocated at a fixed address, we expand such
buffer by creating another buffer at a new location and modify all instruction
operands that access the original buffer to this newly allocated buffer. Specif-
ically, ALICE first allocates a new data segment in the binary, and creates a
mapping of the address of the original buffer to the address in the new data
segment. To ensure that the rewritten binary uses the new address instead of
the original, ALICE scans through all instructions in the original binary and ed-
its the ones that contain an access to the original address by using information
obtained from the previously computed address mapping.
Heap-based buffer. Unlike a static buffer, this type of buffer is allocated dy-
namically through a call to malloc(), alloc() or realloc() routine. Fortu-
nately, ALICE learns when this type of buffer is allocated through the dynamic
taint analysis in Section 4.2. Thus, expanding a heap-based buffer only requires
ALICE to trace back to the instruction allocating such buffer, i.e. a call instruc-
tion to malloc(), alloc() or realloc(), and update the parameter register
value storing the allocation size information to the new buffer size.
Stack-based buffer. Figure 2 shows how ALICE modifies the main routine in
the example from Figure 1b to support the expansion of stack-based buffers:
digest and hexdigest by 16 and 32 bytes respectively. Intuitively, expand-
ing a buffer allocated on the stack at the binary level requires: (i) locating the
routine that uses the corresponding stack frame, (ii) enlarging the frame to be
large enough to hold the new buffers, and (iii) adjusting every access to memory
inside the frame accordingly. ALICE’s previous phase, in Section 4.2, provides
necessary information to satisfy the first requirement (via the shadow stack).
To achieve the second requirement, ALICE rewrites the instructions that are
responsible for increasing and decreasing the stack pointer in the prologue/epi-
logue of the located routine, e.g., [40062d: sub rsp,0x60] in Figure 2a. For
the third requirement, ALICE iterates through all instructions in the routine and
inspects the ones that use the stack offset, i.e., via rsp or rbp registers. ALICE
then recomputes the stack offset with respect to the increased frame size and
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<main_fn_prologue >:
400629: push rbp
40062a: mov rbp ,rsp
40062d: sub rsp ,0x60
...
<call_to_md5 >:
400684: call 4004c0 <strlen@plt >
400689: mov rcx ,rax
40068c: lea rdx ,[rbp -0x40]
400690: lea rax ,[rbp -0x50]
400694: mov rsi ,rcx
400697: mov rdi ,rax
40069a: call 400616 <MD5 >
...
<sprintf_loop_body >:
4006ad: movzx eax ,PTR [rbp+rax*1-0x40]
4006b2: movzx eax ,al
4006b5: mov edx ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54]
4006b8: add edx ,edx
4006ba: movsxd rdx ,edx
4006bd: lea rcx ,[rbp -0x30]
4006c1: add rcx ,rdx
...
4006d3: call 400500 <sprintf@plt >
<sprintf_loop_condition >:
4006d8: add DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54],0x1
4006dc: cmp DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54],0xf
4006e0: jle 4006a8 <main+0x7f >
...
<printf_loop_body >:
4006eb: mov eax ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54]
4006ee: cdqe
4006f0: movzx eax ,PTR [rbp+rax*1-0x40]
4006f5: movzx eax ,al
4006f8: mov esi ,eax
4006fa: mov edi ,0 x4007d4
4006ff: mov eax ,0x0
400704: call 4004e0 <printf@plt >
<printf_loop_condition >:
400709: add DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54],0x1
40070d: cmp DWORD PTR [rbp -0x54],0xf
400711: jle 4006eb <main+0xc2 >
(a) Original Binary
<main_fn_prologue >:
400629: push rbp
40062a: mov rbp ,rsp
40062d: sub rsp ,0x90
...
<call_to_md5 >:
400684: call 4004c0 <strlen@plt >
400689: mov rcx ,rax
40068c: lea rdx ,[rbp -0x70]
400690: lea rax ,[rbp -0x80]
400694: mov rsi ,rcx
400697: mov rdi ,rax
40069a: call 400616 <MD5 >
...
<sprintf_loop_body >:
4006ad: movzx eax ,PTR [rbp+rax*1-0x70]
4006b2: movzx eax ,al
4006b5: mov edx ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x84]
4006b8: add edx ,edx
4006ba: movsxd rdx ,edx
4006bd: lea rcx ,[rbp -0x50]
4006c1: add rcx ,rdx
...
4006d3: call 400500 <sprintf@plt >
<sprintf_loop_condition >:
4006d8: add DWORD PTR [rbp -0x84],0x1
4006dc: cmp DWORD PTR [rbp -0x84],0xf
4006e0: jle 4006a8 <main+0x7f >
...
<printf_loop_body >:
4006eb: mov eax ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x84]
4006ee: cdqe
4006f0: movzx eax ,PTR [rbp+rax*1-0x70]
4006f5: movzx eax ,al
4006f8: mov esi ,eax
4006fa: mov edi ,0 x4007d4
4006ff: mov eax ,0x0
400704: call 4004e0 <printf@plt >
<printf_loop_condition >:
400709: add DWORD PTR [rbp -0x84],0x1
40070d: cmp DWORD PTR [rbp -0x84],0xf
400711: jle 4006eb <main+0xc2 >
(b) Rewritten Binary
Fig. 2: Disassembly of main before & after increasing digest and hexdigest
buffers by 16 and 32 bytes, respectively. Lines containing rewritten instructions
are highlighted in green and changes are in red.
rewrites those instructions if the newly computed offset differs from the original.
Steps of how ALICE recomputes the new stack offset are shown in Algorithm 1
of Appendix C. In Figure 2, ALICE identifies all instructions that access a stack
element and rewrites the ones highlighted in green.
5 Experimental Evaluation
5.1 Experimental Setup
Goals & Datasets. The goal of this evaluation is two-fold, first, to assess
whether ALICE can accurately identify and replace different implementations of
hash functions, and second, to measure ALICE’s effectiveness on real-world appli-
cations. Different implementations may include different hash function structures
(e.g., with or without Init()), different parameter orders, or simply different
implementation details. We apply ALICE to a dataset that consists of four pop-
ular cryptographic libraries: OpenSSL, libgcrypt, mbedTLS, and FreeBL. We
compile each library with different optimization levels, including O0, O1, O2, O3
and Os, into a static library. We then create a simple C application (similar to
12
the one in Figure 1a) that calls exactly one hash function located in the static
library. We compile this application without debugging/relocation symbols and
link it with each individual static library. We also assess ALICE’s effectiveness on
6 real-world applications: smd5 mkpass and ssha mkpass – github projects for
creating LDAP passwords 4, md5sum and sha1sum – string/file checksum pro-
grams, lighttpd – a lightweight webserver program, and curl – a webclient
command line tool. Similar to the first dataset, each program was compiled
without debugging symbols and with various optimization levels, and statically
linked to the cryptographic library used within the program.
Insecure Hash Functions. We consider MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA1, and RIPEMD-
160 as insecure hash functions to be replaced in our experiments. Our objective
is to identify implementations of such hash functions in binaries and replace
them with stronger ones, i.e., SHA-256. A list of all (insecure) hash functions in
each dataset is shown in Table 1.
Environment. Experiments are performed on a virtual machine with Ubuntu
16.04.5 OS, 4GB of RAM and 2 cores of 3.4GHz of CPU running on top of an Intel
i7-3770 machine. The following versions of required tools are used in the experi-
ments: gcc-5.4.0, angr-7.8.2.21 [33], Triton-0.6 [34] and Pin-2.14.71313 [27].
Dataset Version MD2 MD4 MD5 SHA1 RIPEMD160
Crypto Libraries
OpenSSL-1.1.1 7 ILO ILO ILO ILO
libgcrypt-1.8.4 7 7 7 OIL OIL
mbedTLS-2.16.0 ILO ILO ILO ILO 7
FreeBL-3.42 OI 7 OIL,OI OIL,OI 7
Real-world Programs
smd5 mkpass 7 7 OIL 7 7
ssha mkpass 7 7 7 OIL 7
md5sum-5.2.1 7 7 ILO 7 7
sha1sum-5.2.1 7 7 7 ILO 7
curl-7.56.0 7 7 OI 7 7
lighttpd-1.4.49 7 7 7 ILO 7
Table 1: Hash functions used in our test datasets. 7 indicates no hash func-
tion while ILO, OIL and OI denote a function with the parameter order
(input,inputlen,output), (output,input,inputlen) and (output,input).
5.2 Evaluation Results: Cryptographic Libraries
As described in Section 4.2, we only consider automated inference of required
changes from categories C1 and C2 in this work. In order to properly evaluate
ALICE, we perform manual analysis to identify all changes required in C3
and supply them to ALICE. The manually supplied changes for this case (in
this dataset) consist of only a couple of instructions that typically specify loop
termination condition(s). For example, in the binary from Figure 1b, we instruct
ALICE to modify two instructions at addresses 0x4006dc and 0x40070d from
[cmp DWORD PTR [rbp-0x54],0xf] to [cmp DWORD PTR [rbp-0x54],0x1f].
Correctness of Rewritten Binary. To simplify illustration, we first describe
behaviors of the rewritten binaries that are considered incorrect in this dataset.
4 https://github.com/pellucida/ldap-passwords
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First, if ALICE misidentifies any of necessary changes in the input binary, the
resulting binary will not display the correct SHA-256 digest of the input variable.
For instance, it may display nonsensical data, a digest produced by the original
hash function or an incomplete version of the SHA-256 digest. Second, if ALICE’s
rewriting phase does not function properly (e.g., it expands the buffer size by
a different amount or adjusts memory access to the stack incorrectly), it likely
results in a runtime error for the output binary. We consider the correctness of
the rewritten binaries from this dataset to be the converse of the aforementioned
behaviors, i.e., execution of the output binary must terminate without any errors
and it must result in displaying the correct SHA-256 digest of the input variable.
All binaries produced by ALICE in this dataset work as expected.
Binary Size and Execution Overhead. ALICE adds around 3-13KB to the
output binaries (see breakdown details in Appendix G). On further inspection,
we found two main reasons for this overhead. First, ALICE statically adds a patch
implementing the replacement SHA-256 hash function, which contributes around
3KB to the output binary. Second, our underlying binary rewriter, patchkit [35],
expects code and data of this patch to be aligned to a page size (i.e., 4KB in our
testing machine), which can add up to another 8KB to the output binary.
In terms of execution overhead, we implement a simple Pintool [27] to count
the number of instructions executed by the output binaries. We then compare
the result with the baseline, where manual editing is performed on the original
binary’s source code in order to replace the insecure hash function and the
modified source-code is properly optimized by the standard gcc compiler. The
results in Figure 3a show that the binaries produced by ALICE have low execution
overhead with an average of 300 added instructions, or only an increase of 0.3%,
compared to the baseline. We also did not observe any noticeable increase in
execution-time for the output binaries.
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Fig. 3: Evaluation results of ALICE on cryptographic libraries. Original binaries
are compiled with O2. Results for binaries with different optimization flags are
similar and thus omitted.
Toolchain Runtime. Figure 3b shows runtime of ALICE to produce the output
binaries. The total runtime heavily depends on the size of input binaries, and is
dominated by the runtime of the identification phase. This bottleneck happens
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because the identification phase involves heavy-weight analysis such as disassem-
bling the entire binary and/or recovering the binary call graph. It is also worth
noting that such analysis is performed only once and ALICE re-uses the analysis
results in latter phases; this leads to lower runtimes in the latter phases.
5.3 Evaluation Results: Real-World Binaries
Similar to the previous dataset, we manually inspect the binaries in this dataset
to identify changes required in C3 , then supply them to ALICE. Such changes
are mainly related to the digest size that is hard-coded in the source code.
Correctness of Rewritten Binary. We consider rewritten binaries to be cor-
rect if changes performed by ALICE: (1) correctly implement new functionalities
with respect to the target SHA-256 hash function and (2) do not interfere with
the remaining functionalities. For instance, the former enforces the rewritten
binary of md5sum to be able to perform sha256sum of a given input string. We
realize the latter requirement by executing the binaries produced by ALICE with
all test cases (except the ones that use insecure hash functions) provided in their
original respective project repository. We discuss expected functionalities of each
test program in Appendix E.
Table 2 shows the correctness of output binaries produced by ALICE in this
dataset. All output binaries pass all test cases in their original project repository
while only one output binary fails to pass the expected functionality. We manu-
ally examined the failed binary and found that ALICE misidentified an insecure
hash routine. Our further inspection reveals that the main culprit appears to be
our underlying dynamic concrete executor, which fails to output the expected
MD5 digest even if ALICE sets up a proper call stack. As a result, ALICE’s iden-
tification phase did not detect this insecure hash function in the input binary,
and the output binary remained unchanged.
O0 O1 O2
smd5_mkpass
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
ssha_mkpass
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
md5sum
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
sha1sum
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
curl
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
lighttpd
O3 Os
0.9
1.0
1.1
Ov
er
he
ad Baseline
Fig. 4: Overhead in terms of executed instructions of real-world binaries.
Binary Size and Execution Overhead. Table 2 shows the increase in binary
size in this dataset. ALICE adds around 4 to 11KB to the original binary. As
mentioned in Section 5.2, up to 8KB of this overhead is caused by the underlying
binary rewriter performing a patch alignment. The remaining overhead stems
from rewritten functions that are appended at the end of the new binary. We
note that we excluded the result for the curl binary compiled with O3 in Table 2
(and subsequent figures) as ALICE could not produce the correct output binary
in that case.
We did not observe any noticeable execution overhead in terms of execution-
time when running the output binary against the provided test cases from the
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Program OFLAG
Binary Size Correctness of
O R ∆ Output Binaries
md5sum
-O0 43.6KB 51.9KB 8.3KB 3
-O1 35.4KB 45.3KB 9.9KB 3
-O2 35.4KB 45.0KB 9.6KB 3
-O3 39.5KB 49.1KB 9.6KB 3
-Os 31.3KB 40.4KB 9.1KB 3
sha1sum
-O0 43.6KB 51.9KB 8.3KB 3
-O1 35.4KB 45.3KB 9.9KB 3
-O2 35.4KB 45.0KB 9.6KB 3
-O3 39.5KB 49.1KB 9.6KB 3
-Os 31.3KB 40.4KB 9.1KB 3
smd5 mkpass
-O0 22.8KB 29.9KB 7.1KB 3
-O1 18.7KB 25.8KB 7.1KB 3
-O2 18.7KB 25.8KB 7.1KB 3
-O3 22.8KB 29.8KB 7.0KB 3
-Os 18.7KB 25.8KB 7.1KB 3
ssha mkpass
-O0 22.8KB 29.9KB 7.1KB 3
-O1 18.7KB 25.8KB 7.1KB 3
-O2 18.7KB 25.8KB 7.1KB 3
-O3 22.8KB 29.8KB 7.0KB 3
-Os 18.7KB 25.8KB 7.1KB 3
curl
-O0 929.6KB 937.3KB 7.7KB 3
-O1 589.6KB 596.1KB 6.5KB 3
-O2 614.2KB 620.7KB 6.5KB 3
-O3 675.6KB N/A N/A 7
-Os 528.1KB 534.5KB 6.4KB 3
lighttpd
-O0 720.2KB 724.0KB 3.8KB 3
-O1 522.1KB 529.1KB 7.0KB 3
-O2 534.7KB 545.8KB 11.2KB 3
-O3 584.7KB 592.0KB 7.4KB 3
-Os 466.4KB 473.1KB 6.6KB 3
Table 2: Size of original (O) and rewritten (R) binaries of real-world applications.
∆ indicates the binary size overhead.
project’s repository. In addition, we measure the number of executed instructions
for the output binary to perform the expected functionality with respect to the
SHA-256 function and compare it to the baseline, where we manually edit the
source code to replace the insecure hash function. The result, shown in Figure 4,
also indicates negligible (< 5%) increase in execution-time in this case. Note that
even though execution of the rewritten curl binaries becomes faster (requires
2% fewer instructions), this improvement is still negligible. As such, we do not
claim that ALICE helps producing a more efficient output binary.
O0 O1 O2
md5sum
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
sha1sum
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
smd5_mkpass
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
ssha_mkpass
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
curl
O3 Os O0 O1 O2
lighttpd
O3 Os
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Fig. 5: Runtime of the ALICE toolchain on real-world binaries.
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Toolchain Runtime. Figure 5 illustrates ALICE’s runtime to produce each out-
put binary. In simpler programs (e.g., md5sum or smd5 mkpass), ALICE identifies
and replaces weak primitives in less than a minute. For more complex programs
(e.g., lighttpd), ALICE’s runtime can be a bit slower – up to 5 minutes. Most
of the runtime overhead comes from the scoping phase because it needs to in-
strument a large number of instructions (e.g, ≈ 500k instructions for lighttpd)
while execution of simpler programs contains significantly fewer instructions. We
consider ALICE’s runtime to be acceptable since the entire process only needs to
be performed once, making the toolchain runtime not a primary concern.
Program md5sum sha1sum smd5 mkpass ssha mkpass curl lighttpd Avg.
Changes:
C1 1024 1806 932 1676 424 1712 1262
C2 1 1 3 9 8 2 4
C3 1 1 2 3 1 2 1.7
( C1 + C2 )/Total 99.9% 99.94% 99.79% 99.85% 99.78% 99.88% 99.87%
C2 /( C2 + C3 ) 50% 50% 60% 75% 87.5% 50% 70.17%
Table 3: Number of rewritten instructions required for each category of changes.
All test programs are compiled with O2 flag.
Reduction in Manual Efforts. While ALICE currently does not automatically
identify changes from the C3 class, it still saves considerable manual effort. We
quantify such savings in Table 3 as the number of instructions required to be
rewritten in order to implement changes for each category. On average, ALICE
automatically identifies and rewrites 1,266 instructions, which translates into
99.87% reduction in manual efforts. However, we acknowledge that it may be
possible to use existing cryptographic identification tools (with some modifica-
tions) to locate changes from C1 . Even when such tools exist, our toolchain
still significantly reduces manual work by 70.17%. It is worth emphasizing again
that no existing tools are capable of identifying changes from C2 and C3 .
6 Limitations and Future Work
The current version of ALICE has limitations. First, ALICE relies on some under-
lying (open source) building-block tools and inherits their limitations. For exam-
ple, we encountered instances where the underlying x86-64 assembler, Keystone
[36], fails to translate uncommon instructions whose operands contain fs reg-
isters or a rep instruction. Whenever we encounter such an issue, we manually
fixed it by directly hard-coding the correct behavior into ALICE. Furthermore,
the first phase of ALICE relies on the angr framework [33] for disassembly of
stripped binaries; angr does not perform static disassembly with correctness
guarantees. In fact, static disassembly of stripped binaries with correctness guar-
antees is still an open problem [37]. Thus, angr may produce incorrect results
in ALICE’s first phase, which affects outcomes of output binaries.
ALICE also assumes that the routine implementing an insecure hash func-
tion and necessary changes are statically included in the main application. AL-
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ICE does not currently support identifying and replacing insecure cryptographic
primitives located in a dynamic library. Expanding ALICE’s functionalities to
dynamic libraries is possible since most of our underlying tools are capable of
locating and analyzing dynamic libraries used by the main application.
ALICE does not automatically identify nor rewrite changes from C3 and
relies on the user to supply them to the toolchain. In practice, some manual effort
is required to locate changes in binary logic for a large binary. Automating this
process is a challenging problem and is an interesting avenue for future work.
Due to space limitations, we discuss this issue in more detail in Appendix D.
Finally, we design ALICE to target non-malicious legacy binaries and assume
that such binaries are not obfuscated. In practice, even legitimate software may
make use of obfuscation techniques, e.g., to protect intellectual property. Extend-
ing ALICE to support obfuscated but non-malicious binaries (e.g., the software
is not malware trying to evade analysis) is also an interesting future direction.
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7 Conclusion
We have developed ALICE, a toolchain for identifying weak or broken crypto-
graphic primitives and replacing them with secure ones without relying on source
code or debugging symbols. We have implemented a prototype of ALICE that
can detect several cryptographic primitives while only requiring access to the
binaries containing them. Our implementation of ALICE can also automatically
replace weak and/or broken implementations of cryptographic hash functions
in ELF-based x86-64 binaries. We have demonstrated ALICE’s effectiveness on
various open-source cryptographic libraries and real-world applications utilizing
cryptographic hash functions. Our experimental results show that ALICE can
successfully locate and replace insecure hash functions while preserving existing
functionalities in the original binaries.
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Appendix A Detectable Cryptographic Primitives
A list of cryptographic primitives that are detected by ALICE is shown in Table 4.
Primitive Name Constant Type Constant Values
Cryptogrpahic MD2 S-Box 292e43c9. . .
Hash MD5 IVs [01234567, . . . , 76543210]
Functions SHA1 IVs [01234567, . . . , f0e1d2c3]
SHA-256
BLAKE2s
IVs [67e6096a, . . . , 19cde05b]
SHA-512
BLAKE2b
IVs [08c9bcf367e6096a, . . . ]
Block RC2 S-Box d978f9c4. . .
Ciphers RC5 Magic Constant (P) 6b2aed8a. . .
Blowfish S-Box 886a3f24. . .
DES S-Box or SPtrans 0e040d01. . . or 00080802. . .
AES S-Box 637c777b. . .
Elliptic NIST-P192 Prime, Base Point x [ffffffff. . . , 188da80e. . . ]
Curves NIST-P224 Prime, Base Point x [ffffffff. . . , b70e0cbd. . . ]
(Signatures NIST-P384 Prime, Base Point x [ffffffff. . . , aa87ca22. . . ]
& Key Exchange) NIST-P256 Prime, Base Point x [ffffffff. . . , 6b17d1f2. . . ]
NIST-P512 Prime, Base Point x [ffffffff. . . , b70e0cbd. . . ]
Table 4: A list of cryptographic primitives that can be detected by ALICE. Note
that only hash functions can also be automatically augmented in the current
version of ALICE.
Appendix B Implementation Details of ALICE
We describe below implementation details for each phase required in the opera-
tion of the ALICE toolchain.
Phase 1: Identifying and Locating Cryptographic Primitives. We im-
plement this phase on top of the binary analysis platform angr [33]. Specifically,
we use angr’s CFGFast API to perform the disassembly of instructions and gen-
erate the callgraph for a given binary. ALICE uses the resulting disassembly to
determine parts of the binary containing specific constant vectors. ALICE ana-
lyzes the program callgraph to locate candidate routines. Finally, to determine
whether a candidate routine actually implements the target hash function, we
use angr’s built-in dynamic concrete executor to invoke each candidate routine
on a given test string and compare the output with the expected output.
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Phase 2: Scoping Changes. ALICE’s second phase is built on top of a dynamic
analysis framework, Triton [34]. In particular, we used Triton’s taint engine
(which is implemented as a Pintool [27]) for the implementation of our taint
propagation rules. Triton also provides an API for instrumenting a callback
function to be executed at any point during the dynamic taint analysis. We
register two callback functions:
1. The first callback is invoked immediately after the execution of each instruc-
tion. It implements our taint introduction rule by determining whether the
current instruction: (1) is a call to, or a return from, the target hash routine;
(2) results in any new tainted memory; (3) accesses static memory; and (4)
changes a position of the stack frame.
2. The second callback is executed at the end of dynamic taint analysis. It is
responsible for aggregating all tainted memory cells into memory buffers and
outputs the necessary results to the next phase.
1 void a t t r i b u t e ( ( s e c t i on ( ” . ext mem” ) ) ) s i z e t s t a t i c s t r l e n ( const char ∗ s t r ) ;
2
3 void a t t r i b u t e ( ( s e c t i on ( ” . ext mem” ) ) ) sha256 ( const BYTE data [ ] , s i z e t len , BYTE
hash [ ] ) ;
4
5 void a t t r i b u t e ( ( s e c t i on ( ” . ext mem” ) ) ) s ha256 i n i t (SHA256 CTX ∗ ctx ) ;
6
7 void a t t r i b u t e ( ( s e c t i on ( ” . ext mem” ) ) ) sha256 update (SHA256 CTX ∗ctx , const BYTE
data [ ] , s i z e t l en ) ;
8
9 void a t t r i b u t e ( ( s e c t i on ( ” . ext mem” ) ) ) s h a256 f i n a l (SHA256 CTX ∗ctx , BYTE hash [ ] )
;
10
11 void a t t r i b u t e ( ( s e c t i on ( ” . i n l e n ou t ” ) ) ) i n l e n ou t ( const BYTE in [ ] , s i z e t len ,
BYTE out [ ] )
12 {
13 sha256 ( in , len , out ) ;
14 }
15
16 void a t t r i b u t e ( ( s e c t i on ( ” . ou t in ” ) ) ) ou t in (BYTE out [ ] , const BYTE in [ ] )
17 {
18 s i z e t l en = s t a t i c s t r l e n ( in ) ;
19 sha256 ( in , len , out ) ;
20 }
Fig. 6: Snippet of example source code for SHA-256 patch.
Phase 3: Augmenting and Rewriting Changes. There are two steps in this
phase: (1) binary rewriting, and (2) patch generation.
First, we use a static binary rewriting tool, patchkit [35], to edit the input
binary to support new changes. After identifying and augmenting changes into
the affected routines, we use patchkit’s inject API to add the modified routine
into the new section of the original binary. Then, we call the hook API to redirect
all calls from the original routine to this modified routine.
Second, we generate a binary patch containing an implementation of the
replacement hash routine. Performing this is not trivial because we must ensure
the following:
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1 #!/bin/sh
2 data_addr=$1
3 lib_addr=$2
4 entry_addr=$3
5 data_name=$4
6 lib_name=$5
7 entry_name=$6
8 gcc -g -O0 -fno -toplevel -reorder -fno -stack -protector -Wl ,--
section -start=. ext_mem=$lib_addr ,--section -start=.
ext_data=$data_addr ,--section -start =. $entry_name=
$entry_addr sha256.c -o sha256.o
9 objcopy --dump -section .ext_data=$data_name sha256.o
10 objcopy --dump -section .ext_mem=$lib_name sha256.o
11 objcopy --dump -section .$entry_name=$entry_name sha256.o
Fig. 7: Example shell script used to generate a SHA-256 patch.
– The binary patch must be self-contained, i.e., it must not rely on any external
functions and/or libraries. To satisfy this, we statically included implemen-
tations of external functions used by the patch into its source code. Then,
we create the patch based on such functions instead of the external func-
tions/library. The example is shown in Line 1 of Figure 6 where the glibc
strlen() is statically added into the patch’s source code.
– Since the patch will be injected into a new section of a different binary,
it must be compiled with respect to the address of this new section. The
example shell script that we used to compile a SHA-256 patch as well as the
patch’s source code are shown in Figure 7 and 6, respectively. At the source
code level, we separate code and data of the patch by assigning them to
different sections. Then, to ensure that they can be loaded from a specific
address, we compile each with --section-start flag (Line 8 in Figure 7)
and store the result into separate binaries (Line 9-10 in Figure 7).
– The hash function in the patch must have the same order of parameters as
the target hash function. To achieve this, we include hash implementations
of all possible parameter orders into the patch’s source code and assigned
each of the implementation to different binary sections (See Line 11-20 of
Figure 6 for an example). Upon learning the parameters of the target hash
function (from phase 2), we then select the section containing the corre-
sponding implementation and integrate it into the patch at load-time (Line
11 in Figure 7).
Appendix C Recomputing Stack Offset
In phase 3, once detecting a new stack frame size, ALICE determines all instruc-
tions that access memory within the target stack frame. If an access lies above
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any tainted buffer 5 (with respect to the rsp register), ALICE increments such
access by δ, where δ is a sum of the size difference of all tainted buffers located
below the given memory access. Otherwise, the stack offset remains unchanged.
Details of this algorithm are shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Recompute stack offset
Input: old offset - original stack offset w.r.t rsp
Input: buffers - a list of buffers that need to be expanded
Output: New stack offset
1: function NewOffset(old offset, buffers)
2: δ = 0
3: for all b in buffers do
4: if old offset < b.offset+ b.old size then
5: break
6: else
7: δ = δ + b.new size− b.old size
8: end if
9: end for
10: return old offset+ change
11: end function
Appendix D Locating Changes in Binary Logic
<sprintf_loop_body >:
4006ad: movzx eax ,BYTE PTR [rbp+rax*1-0x50]
4006b2: movzx eax ,al
4006b5: mov edx ,DWORD PTR [rbp -0x64]
4006b8: add edx ,edx
4006ba: movsxd rdx ,edx
4006bd: lea rcx ,[rbp -0x30]
4006c1: add rcx ,rdx
4006c4: mov edx ,eax
4006c6: mov esi ,0 x4007d4
4006cb: mov rdi ,rcx
4006ce: mov eax ,0x0
4006d3: call 400500 <sprintf@plt >
<sprintf_loop_condition >:
4006d8: add DWORD PTR [rbp -0x64],0x1
4006dc: cmp DWORD PTR [rbp -0x64],0xf
4006e0: jle 4006a8 <main+0x7f >
(a) Unoptimized Binary
400650: lea rbp ,[rsp+0x10]
400655: lea r14 ,[rsp+0x30]
40065a: mov r12 ,rsp
40065d: mov r13 ,0 xffffffffffffffff
<sprintf_loop_body >:
400664: movzx r8d ,BYTE PTR [r12]
400669: mov ecx ,0 x400784
40066e: mov rdx ,r13
400671: mov esi ,0x1
400676: mov rdi ,rbp
400679: mov eax ,0x0
40067e: call 4004f0 <__sprintf_chk@plt >
400683: add r12 ,0x1
400687: add rbp ,0x2
<sprintf_loop_condition >:
40068b: cmp rbp ,r14
40068e: jne 400664 <main+0x5c >
(b) Optimized Binary
Fig. 8: Partial disassembly of the C code from Figure 1a. Lines containing changes
in binary logic are highlighted in green.
ALICE currently does not automatically identify and rewrite changes in bi-
nary logic ( C3 ) but instead relies on the user to supply them to the toolchain.
In practice, some manual effort may be required to locate changes in binary
5 Recall that all tainted buffers are identified in ALICE’s phase 2.
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logic for a large binary. Automating this process without access to source code
is currently a difficult open problem as we illustrate through a simple example
below.
Figure 8 shows the instructions corresponding to a loop (from Line 19 to
21) in the C code shown in Figure 1a compiled with and without optimizations.
Recall that operating changes in binary logic in this example corresponds to
extending the loop termination conditions from the original digest size (16) to
the new digest size (32 in the case of SHA-256) at the source-code level. Na¨ıvely,
one could employ a heuristic based on the digest size to automatically identify
such changes at the binary level: by finding instructions containing the digest size
value and rewriting them with the new digest size value. However, this heuristic
would only be effective on the unoptimized binary while it would fail on the
optimized binary in Figure 8b. This is because the loop in the optimized binary
is transformed in such a way that it terminates based on a different condition,
i.e., the hexdigest buffer (at instruction 0x400655) instead of the digest size
value. Therefore, solving this problem even for the simple program would require
an approach more sophisticated than a simple heuristic. Solving this problem for
general programs (e.g., the ones from Figure 9) is more challenging.
1 void f ( char∗ input , . . . )
2 {
3 f i l e t ∗ fp ;
4 s i z e t ds = 16 ;
5 unsigned char d1 [ 1 6 ] , d2 [ 1 6 ] ;
6 . . .
7 f i l e r e a d ( fp , d1 , &ds ) ;
8 i f ( ds == 16 && er ro r che ck ( ) ) {
9 md5(d2 , input , nbytes ) ;
10 i f (memcmp(d1 , d2 , 16) ) {
11 . . .
12 }
13 }
14 . . .
15 }
(a) Snippet of mod slotmem shm.c in
httpd-2.4.33 [38]: Change in binary logic
includes editing 16 to 32. This requires
knowing that 16 in Line 8 and 10 refers
to the size of the MD5 digest.
1 void f ( . . . )
2 {
3 . . .
4 md5( f o lde r , s t r l e n ( f o l d e r ) , &d) ;
5 r e t = snp r i n t f ( hcpath , POSIX PATH MAX,
”%s/%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02
x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x−%
s” , path , d [ 0 ] , d [ 1 ] , d [ 2 ] , d [ 3 ] , d [ 4 ] , d
[ 5 ] , d [ 6 ] , d [ 7 ] , d [ 8 ] , d [ 9 ] , d [ 1 0 ] , d
[ 1 1 ] , d [ 1 2 ] , d [ 1 3 ] , d [ 1 4 ] , d [ 1 5 ] , chs ) ;
6 . . .
7 }
(b) Snippet of hcache.c in
mutt-1.10 [39]: Change in binary
logic includes (1): add d[16...31] as
snprintf()’s parameters and (2) modify
the format string accordingly. This
requires knowing that elements in d are
passed into the function individually.
Fig. 9: Simplified snippets of two real-world programs that require operating
changes in binary logic if md5() is replaced by sha256(). Lines reflecting such
changes at the source-code level are highlighted in green.
Given the difficulty of addressing C3 in its generality, it merits a separate
treatment in another paper. Instead, we only outline here a semi-automated ap-
proach to address C3 that assumes access to source code and relies on minimal
inputs from users. For example, assuming the user has access to the source code,
they can identify obvious logic conditions that should be changed, e.g., loop ter-
minating conditions that should be changed. For example, in Figure 1, replacing
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MD5() with SHA-256() by just enlarging hexdigest and digest variables does
not suffice to produce the desired binary; one would have to also edit a loop
terminating condition from i < 16 to i < 32 in line 19 and 24 to reflect the
replacement SHA-256. We argue that it is reasonable to expect a user (which
needs to only understand the interface of the SHA-256 hash function) to know
that SHA-256 produces a digest with length of 32 bytes and that any code using
such a digest should expect a buffer or variable of 32 bytes. The user can then
instruct ALICE that the terminating condition of the loop should be enlarged
from 16 bytes to 32 bytes. We argue that a large portion of the C3 class of
changes can be addressed via such an approach, but leave it for future work to
investigate this in more detail.
Appendix E Expected Functionalities for Real-World
Binaries
This section discusses expected functionalities of both original and rewritten
binaries for all real-world programs used in Section 5.3. The expected function-
alities of original programs are also used as test inputs in ALICE’s scoping phase
in order to perform the dynamic taint analysis.
md5sum and sha1sum are popular checksum command line programs that can
be used to compute the MD5 and SHA1 functions of a given file or input string.
The expected functionality of the rewritten md5sum and sha1sum binaries is to
be able to compute the SHA-256 function on a given input string and output it
to the terminal.
The smd5 mkpass program outputs a salted MD5 password from two inputs
– a user’s secret key and a salt. This password then can be used to perform user
authentication in the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [40]. The
ssha mkpass program works similarly but generates a salted SHA1 password
instead of a salted MD5 password. Hence, we expect ALICE to produce the
rewritten smd5 mkpass and ssha mkpass binaries capable of computing a salted
SHA256 password from a secret key and a salt.
curl is a client-side command-line utility tool for transferring data using
URL syntax. It supports various internet protocols such as HTTP(S), FTP(S),
cookies, proxy tunneling or even access authentication. In particular, we focus
on evaluating ALICE on curl’s implementation of digest access authentication
(or DigestAuth) while removing other functionalities that use an insecure hash
function in the curl binary.
DigestAuth provides an access control mechanism to a webserver. On the
client side, DigestAuth constructs and sends the authorization token to the
webserver by applying a hash function multiple times to the username, password
and nonce generated by the webserver. The webserver then makes a decision
based on the received token whether to grant an access to requested resources
or not. Detailed description of DigestAuth is shown in Appendix F.1.
Particularly, version 7.56.0 of curl implements DigestAuth based on the
RFC 2617 [41] that supports only MD5 as the underlying hash function. Even
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though there is no known attack on such construction yet, it would still be a
good idea to migrate it to a more secure one. Therefore, we expect ALICE to
produce the output curl binary capable of performing DigestAuth using SHA-
256 instead of MD5. Also, as part of this experiment, we implemented a test
webserver in Python using Flask-HTTPAuth 6, which provides the DigestAuth
functionality with MD5 or SHA-256 as the underlying hash function.
lighttpd provides a light-weight implementation of a webserver while re-
maining standards-compliant and flexible. In particular, we are interested in eval-
uating ALICE on lighttpd’s implementation of basic authentication (BasicAuth).
Similar to DigestAuth, BasicAuth is a mechanism to enforce access controls to
web resources. The main distinction is that a client in BasicAuth creates an
authorization token by encoding the username and password with Base64. This
is in contrast with a use of of a hash function in DigestAuth. The webserver
then validates the authorization token by comparing it with the correspond-
ing password stored in the password file. To be secure, the password file must
not store passwords in clear; instead they should be stored in an encrypted
or hashed format. lighttpd’s BasicAuth supports various password encryption
formats, including the insecure SHA1 hash function. We provide further details
of BasicAuth in Appendix F.2. Our goal in this experiment is to replace SHA1
with SHA-256; hence, after applying ALICE on the lighttpd binary, we expect
the output webserver binary to be able to perform BasicAuth using passwords
stored as the SHA-256 format, instead of the SHA1 format. For this experiment,
we implemented a test webclient in Python to perform the client-side function-
ality of BasicAuth.
Appendix F Details of Cryptographic Schemes
F.1 Digest Authentication Scheme
Digest Authentication Scheme (DigestAuth) is depicted in details in Figure 10.
In our experiment from Section 5.3, the client communicates with the server
through the curl executable that implements DigestAuth using SHA1 as the
underlying H function. The rewritten curl is considered correct if it can execute
DigestAuth with H(·) ≡ SHA256(·) and pass all of curl’s existing test cases.
F.2 Basic Authentication Scheme
Figure 11 shows all steps required in Basic Authentication scheme (BasicAuth).
In our experiment from Section 5.3, the server side is deployed using lighttpd
and uses MD5 as the underlying H function. Our goal is to locate the MD5 hash
function in the lighttpd binary and replace it with SHA-256. We consider the
rewritten lighttpd produced by ALICE to be correct if it can also follow the
scheme in Figure 11 with H(·) ≡ SHA256(·).
6 https://flask-httpauth.readthedocs.io
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Client (C) Server (Located at URI: S)
“Request”
nonce = rand()
(realm, nonce)
Compute:
HA1 = H(C : realm : pwd)
HA2 = H(“GET” : S)
H = H(HA1 : nonce : HA2)
(C,H)
Compute:
HA1′ = ReadDatabase(C)
HA2′ = H(“GET” : S)
H′ = H(HA1′ : nonce : HA2′)
if H′ == H
resp = “OK”
else
resp = ⊥
resp
Fig. 10: Digest Authentication Scheme
Client (C) Server (Located at URI: S)
Compute:
T = Base64Encode(C : pwd)
T
Compute:
(C, pwd) = Base64Decode(T )
H = ReadDatabase(C)
if H == H(pwd)
resp = “OK”
else
resp = ⊥
resp
Fig. 11: Basic Authentication Scheme
Appendix G Full Results for Size of Executables
We report increase in size of executable binaries produced by ALICE on the
cryptographic library dataset (see Section 5.2) in Table 5 below.
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Crypto Library Algorithm OFLAG
Binary Size
O R ∆
OpenSSL
1.1.1
MD4
-O0 14.6KB 21.5KB 6.9KB
-O1 14.6KB 21.5KB 6.9KB
-O2 14.6KB 21.4KB 6.8KB
-O3 14.6KB 21.4KB 6.8KB
-Os 14.6KB 21.3KB 6.7KB
MD5
-O0 14.6KB 21.5KB 6.9KB
-O1 14.6KB 21.5KB 6.9KB
-O2 14.6KB 21.4KB 6.8KB
-O3 14.6KB 21.4KB 6.8KB
-Os 14.6KB 21.3KB 6.7KB
SHA1
-O0 31.0KB 37.8KB 6.8KB
-O1 31.0KB 37.8KB 6.8KB
-O2 30.9KB 37.8KB 6.9KB
-O3 30.9KB 37.8KB 6.9KB
-Os 30.9KB 37.7KB 6.8KB
RIPEMD160
-O0 22.8KB 29.7KB 6.9KB
-O1 18.7KB 25.5KB 6.8KB
-O2 18.7KB 25.5KB 6.8KB
-O3 18.7KB 25.5KB 6.8KB
-Os 18.6KB 25.4KB 6.8KB
FreeBL
3.42
MD2
-O0 18.8KB 25.6KB 6.8KB
-O1 18.8KB 25.6KB 6.8KB
-O2 18.8KB 25.6KB 6.8KB
-O3 22.9KB 35.6KB 12.7KB
-Os 18.8KB 25.5KB 6.7KB
MD5
-O0 18.8KB 28.1KB 9.3KB
-O1 18.8KB 28.1KKB 9.3KB
-O2 18.8KB 25.5KB 6.7KB
-O3 18.8KB 25.5KB 6.7KB
-Os 18.8KB 25.4KB 6.6KB
SHA1
-O0 27.0KB 40.4KB 13.4KB
-O1 22.9KB 32.2KB 9.3KB
-O2 22.9KB 29.6KB 6.7KB
-O3 22.9KB 29.6KB 6.7KB
-Os 22.9KB 29.5KB 6.6KB
Crypto Library Algorithm OFLAG
Binary Size
O R ∆
mbedTLS
2.16.0
MD2
-O0 10.5KB 17.4KB 6.9KB
-O1 10.5KB 17.4KB 6.9KB
-O2 10.5KB 17.3KB 6.8KB
-O3 14.6KB 28.0KB 13.4KB
-Os 10.5KB 17.3KB 6.8KB
MD4
-O0 14.6KB 24.0KB 9.4KB
-O1 14.6KB 24.0KB 9.4KB
-O2 10.5KB 21.4KB 10.9KB
-O3 14.6KB 23.9KB 9.3KB
-Os 10.5KB 17.3KB 6.8KB
MD5
-O0 14.6KB 24.0KB 9.4KB
-O1 14.6KB 24.0KB 9.4KB
-O2 14.6KB 21.4KB 6.8KB
-O3 14.6KB 23.9KB 9.3KB
-Os 10.5KB 17.3KB 6.8KB
SHA1
-O0 18.7KB 28.1KB 9.4KB
-O1 14.6KB 24.0KB 9.4KB
-O2 14.6KB 21.4KB 6.8KB
-O3 18.7KB 28.0KB 9.3KB
-Os 14.6KB 21.4KB 6.8KB
libgcrypt
1.8.4
SHA1
-O0 1487KB 1492KB 5KB
-O1 1186KB 1189KB 3KB
-O2 1206KB 1209KB 3KB
-O3 1354KB 1365KB 11KB
-Os 1120KB 1123KB 3KB
RIPEMD160
-O0 1487kB 1492KB 5KB
-O1 1186KB 1189KB 3KB
-O2 1206KB 1209KB 3KB
-O3 1354KB 1365KB 11KB
-Os 1120KB 1123KB 3KB
Table 5: Size of original (O) and rewritten (R) binaries created by compiling
the application in Figure 1a that statically links to various crypto libraries with
different optimization flags. ∆ indicates the binary size overhead.
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